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Abstract
We determine how better information affects the average equity premium in a standard
representative-agent exchange economy. Perfect information obviously eliminates the equity
premium, and a particular kind of information about the level of future consumption always
lowers the average equity premium. Surprisingly, information sometimes raises the average
equity premium, no matter what the preferences of the representative agent. Information purely
about the volatility either of consumption or the marginal utility of consumption raises the
equity premium for a wide class of preferences. Moreover, information can raise the average
equity premium by an arbitrarily large percentage (while still matching important magnitudes,
such as average growth and the risk-free rate). We consider two different economies: a two-
period economy with arbitrary preferences for the representative agent; and an infinite horizon
economy, in which we restrict both preferences and the endowment distribution.
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1 Introduction
Informative signals move asset prices.1 But how does better information affect asset prices, returns
and the equity premium? Personal computers and the internet have made investment information
cheaper, through news services, databases and online financial advice.2 As investors learn more, will
the equity premium on average rise or fall? We answer this question using a standard representative-
agent exchange economy. Intuitively, information should lower the equity premium, since on average
it reduces risk.3 Indeed, in the limiting case of perfect information, risk—and with it the equity
premium—vanishes altogether, so the equity premium falls if information is close to perfect.
The equity premium is the expected return on equity divided by the risk-free rate (minus
1). Following Gollier (2001), we show that information lowers the average equity premium if the
expected return on equity and the forward price of equity are comonotonic: they move in the same
direction as beliefs change (Lemma 1). If they move in the opposite direction, then information
raises the average equity premium. The lemma is an important first step, but it does not tell us what
conditions on primitives—preferences, endowments and beliefs—determines the effect of information,
and it does not give much intuition. Our main task is to provide these conditions and explain their
role.
In a representative agent exchange economy, uncertainty is about future aggregate consumption.
1 See, e.g. Shiller (1981), Mitchell and Mulherin (1994), Fair (2002) and Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005), who
relate aggregate stock returns to news about world events, monetary policy and employment announcements.
2 For a few illustrations of the falling cost of information, see Shapiro and Varian (1999, Chapter 2). Guiso,
Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) give evidence suggesting that computer literacy, financial literacy, and transparency of
financial institutions—all three are correlated with improved information about the return distribution of stocks—help
explain why stock ownership has both increased through time and still varies so widely across developed countries.
3 The dual version of this conjecture is that information raises the average demand for equity. A recent paper by
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005) confirms this property in a mean-variance model.
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We find that information lowers the average equity premium if information only reveals something
about the level of future consumption (Theorem 1), no matter what preferences of the representative
agent. If however information is purely about volatility of consumption, then it sometimes raises the
average equity premium, no matter what the preferences of the representative agent (Proposition 4);
and information about volatility raises the average equity premium for a wide class of preferences
(Theorems 2 and 3).
To clarify terminology, an information structure—in short information—is a mapping between
the state of the world, which determines future consumption, and a probability distribution of the
observed signal. We use news to mean a particular signal realization. A published estimate that
annual growth next year will be 3% is news. How the forecaster comes up with that number, the
research method used, corresponds to an information structure. If a forecaster publishes just a point
forecast, then information is about the level of consumption growth. If the forecaster publishes an
interval forecast, its width reveals something about the volatility of growth, as would the spread of
different point forecasts, or of course a direct forecast of volatility (the size of the business cycle,
say). If the forecaster’s research method improves, or the forecasts reach more ears more often,
then the signal becomes more informative.
Besides explaining how information affects the equity premium, our results might also explain
part of the equity premium puzzle. Suppose an economist calculates the equity premium implied
by a model and does not use some information that agents use. The difference between the average
equity premium with and without information gives the bias from ignoring private information.
If the average equity premium rises with information, then the economist will calculate an equity
premium that is too low for the model economy. In the seminal work of Mehra and Prescott (1985)
and their followers, the only information available to consumers in the model and to the economist
is past and present consumption growth. If agents use other information, and information raises
the equity premium, then the economist would overestimate how risk averse agents must be to
generate the observed equity premium.
The usual view is that the economist is less informed than agents: “The events that make the
price of IBM stock change by a dollar, like the events that make the price of tomatoes change by
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10 cents, are inherently unobservable to economists or would-be social planners”(Cochrane, 2001,
p. 132).4 Another view is that the economist is better informed than agents—or least uses more
information than is reflected in consumption decisions. If consumption is costly to adjust, then it
sometimes does not change as news arrives.5 On this interpretation, the correct equity premium
is the one calculated with no information and the economist’s calculation is one with additional
information: now the economist will calculate an equity premium that is too low if information
lowers the average equity premium.
Our work is related to the recent literature on the effect of the predictability of asset returns
on portfolio management.6 Asset returns are predictable if their distribution depends upon past
observables. This literature focuses on the hedging demand for assets whose returns are correlated
with these observables. If predictability reduces the demand for equity, the equilibrium price of
equity is reduced and the equity premium is increased by information. In the special case with
constant relative risk aversion, the sign of the hedging demand for the risky asset depends upon
whether relative risk aversion is smaller or larger than 1, as shown by Gollier (2004) in a general
setting.
With their emphasis on the impact of learning on asset prices, the closest papers to ours are
Veronesi (2000), Weitzman (2007), and Ai (2007). Weitzman (2007) considers a Bayesian decision
maker who learns from past experience about the variance of growth of log consumption and shows
4 This assertion echoes Hayek’s (1945) earlier complaint that the economist cannot observe most of the “knowledge
of the particular circumstances of time and place” that guides economic action.
5 The consumption-inertia hypothesis has been explored by Grossman and Laroque (1991), Lynch (1996) and
Gabaix and Laibson (2002). A recent trend of the literature initiated by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Bénabou
and Tirole (2002) justifies the hypothesis that consumers disregard information to solve their dynamic inconsistency
problem.
6 See for example Detemple (1986), Kim and Omberg (1996), Brennan (1998), Campbell and Viceira (1999, 2001),
and Gollier (2004).
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that the equity premium can be arbitrarily large for moderate levels of risk aversion. Veronesi (2000)
considers a continuous-time exchange economy in which the representative agent with CES utility
learns about the unknown growth of log consumption. He finds that information about expected
growth rate of consumption raises the instantaneous equity premium when relative risk aversion
is larger than one (and lowers it otherwise). Ai (2007) finds the opposite result in an otherwise
identical economy with production and Kreps-Porteus preferences: information about expected
growth rate of consumption lowers the instantaneous equity premium when relative risk aversion
is larger than one (and raises it otherwise). These last two papers assume that the observed signals
are continuous-time versions of “signal equals the state plus normally-distributed noise." This
informational assumption fits our Theorem 1 (information purely about the level of consumption
growth) where we show that such information always lowers the average equity premium in our
discrete-time exchange economy, no matter what the preferences of the representative agent.7
Since we restrict preferences and the information structure, our work is related to the literature
that extends Blackwell’s (1953) information order by restricting the class of decision problems.
Lehman (1988) and Athey and Levin (2000) consider “monotone decision problems,” ones for which
the posterior beliefs generated by an information structure can be ordered so that the decision
maker’s optimal action is increasing in the signal. Lehman considers posterior beliefs that stand
in the monotone likelihood ratio order; Athey and Levin extend Lehman (1988) to other orders,
including first- and second-order stochastic dominance. In each case, they find changes in the
information structure that make all agents facing a class of monotone decision problems better off.
Our work differs from this literature on three counts. First, although we have a representative
agent we consider the effect of information on equilibrium in a market, not a decision problem.
Second, we determine how information affects the equity premium, not welfare.8 Third, we only
7 Veronesi (2000) and Ai (2007) consider signals that are bounded away from perfect information. If information
were perfect—agents knew exactly the entire path of future consumption—then the equity premium would obviously
be zero, exactly as in our model.
8 Indeed, a representative agent is always indifferent about information in an exchange economy, since that agent
always consumes the aggregate endowment. We eschew any welfare comparisons in a representative agent model:
Even if it is a good positive model, it can lead to incorrect welfare conclusions about information (Schlee, 2001).
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consider Blackwell improvements in information. Despite these differences, all our results are for
monotone decision problems: To prove comonotonicity of the price of equity and the expected rate
of return we show each is monotone. Since the price of equity increases with the demand for it, we
can exploit the large literature on portfolio comparative statics in the standard one-safe, one-risky
asset problem.
We begin by writing down a two-period version of the Lucas (1978) exchange economy, the
standard model to examine asset pricing.9 The two-period assumption allows us to consider gen-
eral preferences for the representative agent. This generality allows us to identify exactly what
preference properties are responsible for the results. At the end of the paper we drop the two-
period assumption, but to make headway we are forced to specialize the endowment distribution
and preferences. But under the restrictions we impose, we are able extend all our major results to
an infinite horizon model.
2 The equity premium in a two-period model
There are two dates, 0 and 1, and a single consumption good. The representative agent maximizes
the expectation of the function u(c0)+v(c1) where ct is consumption at date t.10 We assume that u
and v are three-times continuously differentiable, with positive first and negative second derivatives
on R++. The agent is endowed with z0 > 0 units of the good at date 0. There are two assets, one
risky, one safe, and the agent is endowed with one unit of the risky asset and zero units of the safe
asset. A unit of the risky asset is a claim on the random date-1 endowment ez (assumed positive in
each state). The price of the risky asset at date 0 is Pe. The safe asset has a price of one at date 0
9 It is used by Prescott and Mehra (1985), Barsky (1989), Weil (1989), Franke, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam
(1998), Weitzman (2007) and many others.
10 Additively separability is just to reduce notation. All the two-period results hold for any increasing, concave
function U(c0, c1): simply replace v(z) by U(z0, z) in each of the results in Section 4.
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and has a gross payoff of Rf at date 1.
In the economy with additional information, the agent at date zero observes a simple random
variable eη correlated with ez. Since eη and ez are correlated, the agent’s posterior beliefs about the
aggregate consumption, and so equilibrium prices, depend on η. After observing η at date 0 the
representative agent buys b units of the risk-free asset and buys a share a of the future random
endowment. Normalize the price of date-0 consumption to one, and redefine the units of the risk-free
asset so that its date-0 price is one. The optimal portfolio solves
max
(a,b)∈R2
u (z0 + (1− a)Pe − b) +E [v (aez + bRf ) |η] , (1)
and satisfies the first order conditions
u0 (z0 + (1− a)Pe − b)Pe = E
£
v0 (aez + bRf ) ez|η¤ (2)
u0 (z0 + (1− a)Pe − b) = E
£
v0 (az˜ + bRf ) |η
¤
Rf . (3)
After imposing the equilibrium condition (a, b) = (1, 0), and using the normalization u0(z0) = 1,
equation (2) gives us the equilibrium price of equity Pe(η) = E [v0 (ez) ez|η] and equation (3) gives us
the risk-free rate
Rf (η) =
1
E [v0(ez) | η] . (4)
The realized return on equity is z/Pe(η), so the expected return on equity is Re(η) = E [ez|η] /Pe(η).
The equity premium (plus 1) is
φ(η) =
Re(η)
Rf (η)
=
E [ez | η] E [v0(ez) | η]
E [ezv0(ez) | η] . (5)
Combine (2) and (3) to get
Pe(η)Rf (η) =
E [ezv0 (ez) |η]
E [v0 (z˜) |η] . (6)
The product Pe(η)Rf (η) is the forward price of equity, the price if the payment is made at date 1
instead of date 0.
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From an ex ante viewpoint, the average equity premium is E[φ(eη)]. In an economy with no
additional information, the equilibrium risk-free rate is
R0f =
1
E [v0(ez)] , (7)
and the equity premium (plus 1) is
φ0 =
E [ez] E [v0(ez)]
E [ezv0(ez)] . (8)
The equity premium is of course nonnegative (φ(η) ≥ 1, φ0 ≥ 1) if the agent is risk averse, and it
increases as the agent becomes more risk averse.
We compare the equity premium in the economy without additional information to the average
equity premium in an economy with additional information. As already mentioned, we interpret
our results three ways.
• The first and most fundamental is the standard one: the agent gets better information about
consumption growth and we want to know how the equity premium changes in response. In
the infinite horizon version of the model, it is natural to think that information improves
through time, perhaps as a result of technological progress. Our results would then tell us
what happens to the average equity premium through time.
• The second interpretation is that information is private to the agent and not used by the
economist. In this situation, the economist calculates an equity premium of φ0. The actual
value is φ(η) when the agent observes η, so the bias from private information is φ0−E[φ(eη)].
• The third interpretation uses the consumption inertia hypothesis: the economist uses public
information not reflected in consumption choices. Here the actual and estimated values are
reversed from the second interpretation. For these last two intrepretations, we want to know
when there is a bias and what its direction is.
In the second and third interpretations the economist has an unbiased view of the agent’s beliefs
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over the date-1 endowment: we assume that the economist knows the agent’s prior belief; and the
average posterior belief with information always equals the prior. Since the mean growth rate E[ez]
is linear in beliefs, there is no bias in the economist’s calculation of average growth: by the iterated
law of expectations, E?η [E?z[ez|eη]] = E[ez]. Similarly, since the price of equity is linear in beliefs the
bias in asset prices is zero: E?η[Pe(η)] = P 0e . But since the equity premium is not linear in beliefs,
we will not in general have E?η[φ(eη)] = φ0.
We describe an information structure by the distribution of posterior beliefs. A more common
approach specifies a prior belief p for date-1 consumption z, and, for each z in the support of p, a
conditional distribution π(·|z) over signal realizations, η. From these primitives, the prior distri-
bution of signals is λ(η) =
P
z π(η|z)p(z), and the posterior probability that date-1 consumption
is z after observing signal η is p(z|η) = p(z)π(η|z)/λ(η). We instead specify p(·|η) for each η;
these conditional beliefs, together with a prior signal distribution λ(·), determine the prior belief
and the conditional signal densities, π. Of course the two approaches are equivalent, but ours is
more convenient here since the important property of information is how signals order the posterior
beliefs p(·|η).
3 How information affects the equity premium: a general suffi-
cient condition
The most surprising result is that information can raise the average equity premium. To explain
informally, note first that information raises the average ex ante equity premium if the equity
premium φ is a convex function of beliefs.11 More formally, let Fη be the probability distribution of
11 Indeed one version of Blackwell’s Theorem is that experiment A is more informative than B if and only if
the expectation of any convex function of beliefs is higher with A than B (Blackwell, 1953, Theorem 1, p. 266).
Intuitively, with no information, posterior beliefs must be equal to the prior. With information, posterior beliefs are
random, with mean equal to the prior. And the more informative the signal, the more spread out the distribution of
posteriors, which raises the expectation of any convex function of beliefs.
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ez | η, and let ϕ(Fη) = φ(η) be the equity premium as a function of the this probability distribution.
Then, information reduces the average equity premium if Eϕ(F?η) ≤ ϕ(EF?η), and the inequality
holds for every information structure if and only if ϕ is concave. If ϕ is not concave, information
must sometimes raise the average equity premium, and if it is convex, information always raises
it.12 Thus, the technical question is whether the equity premium is concave (or convex) in beliefs
about date-1 consumption.
To illustrate what determines how information affects the equity premium, suppose for a mo-
ment that the signals do not affect the price of equity: Pe(η) = E[zv0(z)|η] is constant in η. We
can interpret this supposition either as a restriction on information, or on preferences. (With log
utility, for example, the price of equity is always equal to 1.) In this case, information lowers the
average equity premium if
E?η
∙
E[z|eη] E[v0(z)|eη]¸ ≤ E?ηhE[z|eη]i E?ηhE[v0(z)|eη]i, (9)
which just says that the covariance between expected consumption and the expected marginal
utility of consumption is negative. Inequality (9) holds if expected date-1 consumption and the
risk-free rate (= 1/E[v0|η]) are comonotonic (as the signal varies). Since the price of equity is
constant, the last condition is the same as comonotonicity between the rate of return on equity,
E[z]/E[zv0(z)], and the forward price of equity, E[zv0(z)]/E[v0(z)]. The next result, an application
of Lemma 11 in Gollier (2001, page 415), shows that this conclusion still holds if the price of equity
depends on the signal. Let D denote a set of cumulative distribution functions for ez with bounded
support in R++. We show in the appendix that this Lemma follows as a simple corollary from the
familiar Covariance Inequality (Hardy, et. al., Theorem 43).13
12 The risk-free rate Rf (Fη) = 1/E [v0(?z) | η] is clearly convex in Fη, so information always raises the average
risk-free rate — even for the case in which the risk-free rate in the informed economy does not depend on the realized
signals.
13 Hardy, et. al. attribute it to Tchebychef.
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Lemma 1 Let v be a differentiable function on R++ with v0 > 0. Define functionals ϕ, V1 and V2
on D by 14
ϕ(F ) =
R
zdF (z)
R
v0(z)dF (z)R
zv0(z)dF (z)
,
V1(F ) =
R
zdF (z)R
zv0(z)dF (z)
and V2(F ) =
R
zv0(z)dF (z)R
v0(z)dF (z)
.
Consider any (F1, F2) ∈ D2. The following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) For all λ ∈ [0, 1] ,we have λϕ(F1) + (1− λ)ϕ(F2) ≤ ϕ(λF1 + (1− λ)F2).
(ii) [V1(F1)− V1(F2)] [V2(F1)− V2(F2)] ≥ 0.
Proof : Appendix.
The functional V1 is the expected return on equity and V2 is the forward price of equity. If
condition (i) in Lemma 1 holds for all pairs of c.d.f.’s in D, then ϕ is concave on D. Condition (ii)
says that V1 and V2 rank the two distributions the same way; if (ii) holds for all pairs of possible
realizations of the posterior distribution for ez such that the signal leading to F2 is higher than the
signal leading to F1, then V1 and V2 are comonotonic in the signal η. By Lemma 1, concavity of ϕ
requires V1 and V2 to rank all distributions the same way.
Notice that the equality V2(F ) = p is the first-order condition for the maximization problem
with objective Ev(aez + (1− a)p), which is the static two-asset portfolio problem. We will exploit
the large literature on that problem to determine when p(η) = Pe(η)Rf (η) is monotone in η.
14 We are abusing notation by taking the domain of ϕ to be D rather than the set of signal realizations.
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4 The CRRA/log-normal case
To illustrate some possibilities, we specialize for now to the familiar case of constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) preferences and log-normal endowment distributions: for every signal realization
η, ln ez | η is normally distributed with mean μ(η) and variance σ2(η); and v0(z) = z−γ, where γ > 0
is the constant degree of relative risk aversion. In this case, we have closed form solutions for the
relevant expectations:15
E [ez | η] = exp(μ+ 1
2
σ2) (10)
E
£
v0(ez) | η¤ = exp−γ(μ− 1
2
γσ2) (11)
E
£ezv0(ez) | η¤ = exp(1− γ)(μ+ 1
2
(1− γ)σ2). (12)
Insert these three calculations into (5) to find that the conditional equity premium is
φ(η) = exp(γσ2(η)). (13)
The mean equity premium in the informed economy is Eφ(eη) = E exp(γeσ2), where eσ2 = σ2(eη).
The equity premium in the uninformed economy is (here eμ = μ(eη))
φ0 =
E
£
exp(eμ+ 12eσ2)¤E £exp(−γ(eμ− 12γeσ2))¤
E
£
exp((1− γ)(eμ+ 12(1− γ)eσ2))¤ . (14)
Information lowers the average equity premium if and only if Eφ(eη) ≤ φ0. Define xi(η) = lnVi(Fη),
and use equations (10), (11) and (12), to find
x1(η) = γμ(η) + 12γ(2− γ)σ2(η)
15 These equalities follow since the moment generating function for the normal distribution is exp(tμ + 12 t
2σ2).
Equivalently, the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact in the normal-CARA case: when ?x is normal we have
E exp k?x = exp(k(E?x+ 1
2kV ar(?x))).
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x2(η) = μ(η) + 12(1− 2γ)σ2(η).
The following proposition is a direct consequence of Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose that ln ez | η is normally distributed with mean μ(η) and standard deviation
σ(η), for all η, and that that relative risk aversion equals a constant γ. Information lowers (raises)
the average equity premium if the functions x1(·) and x2(·) are (anti-)comonotonic.
By Proposition 1, information can either raise or lower the equity premium even in the CRRA/log-
normal case, whatever the value of γ. We consider 4 examples. The first one generalizes the case
of perfect information (σ(η) = 0 for all η).
Example 1 (Learning about the mean of log consumption only, σ(η) constant) Suppose
that σ2 does not depend on the signal. Clearly, x1(·) and x2(·) are comonotonic in that case. By
Proposition 1, information purely about the mean of log consumption lowers the average equity
premium. Indeed, since the conditional equity premium φ(η) does not depend on the signal, the
equity premium falls for each signal realization. A special case is when eμ itself is normally distributed
with mean μ0 and variance σ20. In that case, the prior distribution of ln ez is normal with mean μ0
and variance σ2 + σ20, so that φ
0 = exp γ(σ2 + σ20), which is larger than φ(η) = Eφ(eη) = exp(γσ2).
Information about the mean of log consumption lowers the variance of log consumption from σ2+σ20
to σ2. The (instantaneous) equity premium is γ(σ2 + σ20) without information, and only γσ
2 with
information. The fall in the equity premium is thus proportional to the quality of information
(measured by σ20/(σ
2 + σ20)). With perfect information (σ
2 = 0) the equity premium goes to zero.
Example 2 (Learning about the variance of log consumption only, μ(η) constant).
Suppose now that μ does not depend on the signal, as in Weitzman (2007). Then x1(·) and x2(·)
are comonotonic precisely when 2− γ and 1− 2γ have the same sign, that is, when γ lies outside
the interval [1/2, 2]. When γ belongs to this interval (log utility for example), the expectation of
learning about the variance of log consumption always raises the average equity premium!16
16 In the log case, it is easy to check that information increases the average equity premium by an amount that is
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Example 3 (Learning about the variance of consumption only, mean consumption con-
stant) In Example 2 we kept the mean of ln ez (μ) constant across the different possible sig-
nals. But since Eez = μz = exp(μ + σ2(η)/2), the signal affects the mean of consumption it-
self. Now suppose that mean consumption Eez = μz does not depend on the signal. In this case,
μ(η) = lnμz − σ2(η)/2 for all η. Rewrite x1 and x2 as a function of (μz, σ) rather than of (μ, σ)
so that x1(η) = γ lnμz + γ(1 − γ)σ2(η)/2 and x2(η) = lnμz − γσ2(η) to conclude that x1 and x2
are comonotonic, and information lowers the average equity premium if and only if γ > 1. When
relative risk aversion is less than one, information raises the average equity premium.
Example 4 (Learning about both the mean and variance of log consumption, risk-free
rate constant). Suppose that E [v0(ez) | η] = exp ¡−γ(μ− γσ2/2)¢ = R−1f does not depend on the
signal, equivalently, the signal does not affect the risk-free rate in the economy with information.
A constant risk-free rate implies that μ(η) = γ−1 lnRf + γσ2(η)/2, so that the signal affects both
the mean and variance of log consumption; in particular they are positively correlated. Rewrite
x1(η) = lnRf + γσ2(η) and x2(η) = γ−1 lnRf + (1 − γ)σ2(η)/2 and to see that x1 and x2 are
anti-comonotonic and information raises the average equity premium precisely when γ is larger
than one.
We summarize the examples in Table 1. Information lowers the equity premium when signals
affect mean log consumption only; or when they affect volatility of log consumption only and
relative risk aversion is less than 1
2
or greater than 2. Information has the opposite effect on the
average equity premium in Examples 3 and 4. Examples 1, 2, and 4 are special cases of results in
Section 5, and the last column of Table 1 indicates which one.
Example 4 is the most surprising. Given CRRA, the preference restriction γ > 1 just says that
the agent is moderately risk-averse. Although the risk-free rate certainly does move in response to
news, it is likely to move much less than the price of equity or the expected return on equity, and
Example 4 is just the limiting case in which the risk-free rate is constant. Yet these two seemingly
just equal to V ar(exp(?σ2/2)).
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value of γ → 1/2 1 2 Special case of (Section 5) ↓
Ex 1: σ(η) = constant − − − − − − − Theorem 1
Ex 2: μ(η) = constant − 0 + + + 0 −
Ex 3: lnμz(η) = constant + + + 0 − − − Theorem 2
Ex 4: lnRf (η) = constant − − − 0 + + + Theorem 3
Table 1: The effect of information on the average equity premium in the CRRA/log-
normal case. The first column gives what variable the realized signal does not affect, the last
the corresponding result in Section 5. (μ = mean log consumption, σ = standard deviation of log
consumption, μz = mean consumption, Rf = risk-free rate, and γ = relative risk aversion.)
innocuous assumptions imply that information raises the average equity premium.
To help understand Example 4, recall that information always raises the average equity premium
if the equity premium is a convex function of beliefs. With the risk-free rate constant, the equity
premium is just E [ez|η] /Pe(η)Rf . Suppose (wlog) that higher signals η lead to both higher means
and variances of log consumption, so E [ez|η] rises with η. If relative risk aversion is greater than
1, there are two competing effects of higher signals on the price of equity. The increased variance
of date-1 log consumption tends to increase saving (for precautionary reasons), but the increased
mean of date-1 consumption tends to decrease saving (from wealth effects); the first raises and the
second lowers the demand for equity. If the risk-free rate is constant (μ(η) = γ−1 lnRf +γσ2(η)/2)
and γ > 1, then the mean rises “fast enough” as the variance rises, which lowers the demand for
equity, hence its price. So a higher signal leads both to higher mean date-1 consumption and lower
date-0 price of equity, and the combination ensures that the equity premium rises at an increasing
rate as beliefs about the mean of log date-1 consumption rise.17
Example 4 suggests a conjecture for more general economies: if the risk-free rate doesn’t vary
“too much” in response to news and the representative agent is at least moderately risk averse then
information raises the equity premium. We return to this conjecture in Section 5.4.
Quantitative Importance: How Much Can Information Raise the Equity Pre-
17 One can also directly verify that the ratio f/g of two positive linear functions with f increasing and g decreasing
is convex. (E[z] and Pe are both linear in beliefs.)
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mium? Examples 2-4 show that information about volatility can raise the average equity premium.
The following calibration argument shows it can be quantitatively important in a model that
matches some important historical averages. We consider a realistic calibration of the model and
use it to calculate the effect of information on the equity premium in the setting of Example 4.
Using annual data from 1889 to 1978, Kocherlakota (1996) calculates that −1+Eez/z0 = 1.8% and
V ar(ez/z0) = (3.6%)2. If we assume ez is log-normal, this calculation is consistent with σ = 3.54%
and μ = 1.72%. We suppose that information affects the conditional variance of log consump-
tion. There are two possible signals. Signal η1 yields a low variance σ21(t) = (3.54%)
2(1 − t),
whereas signal η2 yields a higher variance σ22(t) = (3.54%)
2(1 + kt),with k positive. In order to
preserve the average variance to its historical mean, we set the probability of the low variance
signal to be π = k/(1 + k). We assume that the signals do not affect the risk-free rate, so that
μ(ηi) = γ−1 lnRf + γσ2(ηi)/2.
Assume that t = 0.75, k = 99, and γ = 5. We describe the information structure for these
parameter values in Table 2. There is a 99% chance that the low volatility state occurs, in which
case the volatility equals half of its historical mean. There is a 1% chance that the volatility be
8.67 times its historical mean. In Figure 1, we have drawn the prior density of ez. The dotted curve
is the log-normal distribution with the same mean and variance (μ, σ), but obviously thiner tails.
Probability μ(η) σ(η) lnRf φ(η)− 1
η1 99% 1.49% 1.77% 7.03% 0.16%
η2 1% 24.98% 30.71% 7.03% 60.24%
Mean - 1.72% 2.06% 7.03% 0.76%
Table 2: The information structure with t = 0.75, k = 99, and γ = 5.
In the absence of information, we obtain that the equity premium φ0 equals 0.66%,18 whereas
18 An external observer could have used the average volatility E?σ = 2.06% to estimate the equity premium around
−1+ exp γ(E?σ) = 0.21%. The existence of fat tails in this calibration explains why φ0 is three times larger than this
estimation. As claimed by Abel (2002) for example, fat tails can solve the equity premium puzzle.
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Figure 1: The unconditional distribution of aggregate consumption. The dotted curve is the log-
normal distribution with the same first two moments.
the average equity premium when information is available to investors equals 0.76%. Information
raises the equity premium by 16%. In Figure 2, we have drawn the average equity premium with in-
formation (plain curve) and without information (dashed curve), as a function of the representative
agent’s risk aversion.
More generally we can use Example 4 to show that, if γ > 1, information can raise the equity
premium by any percentage while matching any risk-free rate and growth rate. Suppose as in
Example 4 that the signals do not affect the risk-free rate. Substitute μ(η) = γ−1 lnRf + γσ2(η)/2
into (14) to find the equity premium in the uninformed economy is
φ0 =
E[exp
¡
(1 + γ)12σ
2(eη)¢]
E[exp
¡
(1− γ)12σ2(eη)¢] . (15)
The average equity premium in the informed economy is still E[exp(γσ2(eη))]. Now fix any
risk-free rate Rf and any growth rate z. If γ > 1, then there is a distribution of the variance
σ2(eη) such that the ratio E[φ(eη)]/φ0 can be arbitrarily large, and the risk-free rate in the informed
economy is Rf and the ex ante average growth rate, Eη [Ez[ez|eη]], equals z.
There are several ways to prove this fact. One uses the property that for γ > 1, both the
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Figure 2: The average equity premium with (plain) and without (dashed) information as a function
of risk aversion.
equilibrium price of equity in the informed economy, exp
¡
(1− γ)σ2/2
¢
, and the equity premium
in the informed economy, exp(γσ2), are more convex than expected consumption in the informed
economy, exp
¡
(1 + γ)σ2/2
¢
.19 Now continually make the distribution of expected consumption,
exp
¡
(1 + γ)σ2(eη)/2¢, riskier, while preserving its mean at zR−1/γf . The average equity premium
in the informed economy, E[exp(γσ2(eη))], increases without bound, while the equity premium in
the uniformed economy falls (the numerator in (15) stays the same and the denominator rises).20
And the informed economy grows on average at z: with the risk-free rate constant at Rf , we have
Eη [Ez[ez|eη]] = R1/γf E £exp ¡(γ + 1)σ2(eη)/2¢¤ = z.
Remark 1 Weitzman (2007) shows that the equity premium can be arbitrarily large for any level
of risk aversion in his model of learning about volatility of consumption from past consumption
19For two functions f and g defined on a real interval I, g is more convex than f if there is a convex function T on
the range of f such that g(z) = T (f(z)) for all z in I. For example, we have exp(γσ2) = T (exp
?
(1 + γ)σ2/2
?
) for
the function T (y) = y2γ/(γ+1), which is convex whenever γ ≥ 1.
20These facts follow from Theorem 3 in Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) on mean-utility-preserving increases in risk.
Suppose that a change in the distribution of z causes a mean-preserving increase in risk in the distribution of a
function f of z. Their Theorem 3 implies that if g is more convex than f , the distribution change raises the mean of
g. Their theorem is a simple extension of the Arrow-Pratt theorem (found for example in Gollier (2002), pp. 20-1).
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realizations. That information can raise the equity premium arbitrarily for any level of risk aversion.
Weitzman goes further than we do by assuming an inverse-χ2 distribution for eσ, which implies a
Student−t distribution for ez. It implies φ0 = +∞.
Remark 2 We can substantially generalize Example 4. As just emphasized, the assumption that
the risk-free rate does not depend on the signal imposes a restriction on the relationship between
the mean and variance of log consumption across signals. For any two signals η0 and η00 let ∆μ =
μ(η00) − μ(η0), ∆σ2 = σ2(η00) − σ2(η0), and ∆xi = xi(η00) − xi(η0). Use the definitions of xi(·) to
find that
∆x1∆x2
γ
= (∆μ)2 − 32∆μ∆σ2(γ − 1) +
1
4(∆σ
2)2(2γ2 − 5γ + 2). (16)
Suppose (wlog) that ∆σ2 ≥ 0. It is easy to confirm from equation (16) that ∆x1∆x2 < 0 provided
that (γ/2− 1)∆σ2 ≤ ∆μ ≤ (γ − (1/2))∆σ2. Setting ∆μ = γ∆σ2/2 gives us Example 4. The other
three examples can also be verified directly from (16).
5 The effect of information on the equity premium
We now drop the assumptions of log-normal signals and constant relative risk aversion and extend
all the results from the last section. By considering more general preferences and distributions, we
are able to see the forces behind these results more clearly.
5.1 Information sometimes raises the equity premium, no matter what the
preferences of the representative agent
The following result in Gollier (2001, Proposition 99) shows that the equity premium cannot be
(globally) concave, so information sometimes raises the average equity premium, no matter what
the representative agent’s preferences.
Proposition 2 For any strictly increasing, strictly concave date-1 utility function v for the repre-
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sentative agent, there is an information structure that raises the average equity premium.
Proof : Appendix.
Since perfect information lowers the equity premium, we can show that information always
lowers (or always raises) the average equity premium only by restricting the information structure.
We do so by restricting the distribution of posterior beliefs over date-1 consumption. We suppose
that the set of posterior beliefs that an information structure generates can be ordered by one of
two stochastic dominance relations: first-order stochastic dominance (FSD); and riskiness. Let G
and F be two c.d.f.’s with bounded support D in R+.
Definition 1 G first order stochastically dominates F if
R
f(y)dG(y) ≥
R
f(y)dF (y) for all
continuous increasing functions f on R+, with the inequality strict for at least one such function.
Definition 2 G is riskier than F if
R
f(y)dG(y) ≤
R
f(y)dF (y) for all concave functions f on
R+, with the inequality strict for at least one such function.
These two cases are natural ones to consider because they are easy to interpret. Roughly, if the
set of posterior beliefs over date-1 consumption can be ordered by FSD, then the information is
about the level of consumption, as in Example 1; if the posterior beliefs over date-1 consumption
can be ordered by riskiness, then information is purely about the volatility of consumption, as in
Example 3. We also consider information that combines both elements, as in Example 4.
5.2 Information about the level of consumption: posterior beliefs ordered by
FSD
As just mentioned, if the posterior beliefs are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance for a
given prior about ez, then information is about the level of date-1 consumption. If we consider all
prior belief/information structure combinations that order the posteriors by FSD, then relative risk
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aversion must be constant and equal to one, implying that date-1 utility is log.21
Proposition 3 Suppose that the representative agent’s date-1 utility satisfies the Inada condi-
tion v0(∞) = 0. Then the average equity premium falls with information for every prior be-
lief/information structure combination that orders the posteriors by FSD if and only if RRA(z) = 1
for all z > 0, i.e. the representative agent’s date-1 utility is log.
Proof : Appendix.
To explain intuitively, suppose that the Inada condition v0(∞) = 0 holds. Recall that (zv0(z))0 =
v0(z)(1−RRA(z)) so the size of relative risk aversion determines whether zv0 is increasing or not.
If relative risk aversion exceeds 1 on some interval, then clearly the expected return on equity V1
rises with an FSD improvement if the change is confined to that interval (since the price of equity
falls and the expected date-1 consumption rises, with such an FSD improvement). Unfortunately,
we know that an FSD improvement sometimes lowers the demand for a risky asset in a two-asset
problem (and therefore reduces the equilibrium forward price of equity V2) if relative risk aversion
is somewhere larger than 1 (Fishburn and Porter, 1976). By Lemma 1, one can therefore find an
information structure with posteriors that can be ordered according to FSD that raises the average
equity premium. On the other hand, if relative risk aversion is somewhere less than 1, we know from
Fishburn and Porter (1976) that the demand for a risky asset rises with an FSD improvement if the
change is confined to that interval. Therefore, this improvement raises the forward price of equity
V2. Unfortunately, the expected return on equity V1 sometimes falls with an FSD improvement if
RRA < 1. Hence V1 and V2 cannot always be comonotonic when the posterior beliefs are ordered
by FSD unless RRA = 1 globally.
Proposition 3 shows that we must restrict the information structure further if we want to use
anything other than log utility.
21 Athey and Levin (2000) consider posteriors ordered by FSD for a fixed prior. To prove the necessity of (b), we
must allow the prior to vary.
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Definition 3 F2 dominates F1 in the monotone likelihood ratio order (MLR) if there is an
increasing function c on R++ such that F2(x) =
R x
0 c(ξ)dF1(ξ) for all x ≤ inf{y|F1(y) = 1}.
If the cdf’s are differentiable then the definition collapses to the ratio of the densities, F 01/F 00,
being increasing. Milgrom (1981) defines signal η2 to be better news than η1 if the posterior given
η2, F (·|η2), first-order stochastically dominates F (·|η1) for every prior belief. He proves that η2 is
better news than η1 if and only if F (·|η2) MLR dominates F (·|η1).22 For example, suppose that,
conditional on z, the signal equals z “plus noise”: η˜|z = z + ˜, where ˜ is a random variable with
mean zero and independent of z. If the distribution of ˜ is given by a density whose log is concave
(e.g. the Normal distribution), then the posterior beliefs will be ordered by MLR.
Theorem 1 (MLR) If the signals order the posterior c.d.f.’s by MLR, then information lowers
the average equity premium.
Proof : Appendix.
For this natural restriction of information to be about the level of consumption, information lowers
the average equity premium, as casual intuition suggests it should. We stress that this conclusion
holds for all strictly increasing, strictly concave utilities and all prior beliefs, the only such result
we present.
Remark 3 In Example 1 the signals only affect the mean of log consumption and information
lowers the average equity premium. This example is a special case of Theorem 1 since an increase
in the mean of a log-normal random variable is an MLR improvement for the random variable itself:
letting f(·|μ) be the density of z when ln z is normal with mean μ, it is easy to show that, for any
μ0 > μ, f(z|μ0)/f(z|μ) is increasing in z, so that f(·|μ0) MLR dominates f(·|μ).
22 Since Proposition 5 requires all combinations of prior beliefs and information structures to order the posteriors
by FSD, that result considers a wider set of information structures than does Theorem 1.
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5.3 Information about the volatility of consumption: posterior beliefs ordered
by riskiness
Information about volatility has dramatically different effects on the equity premium than informa-
tion about levels. To model information purely about volatility we assume that the posteriors are
ordered by riskiness, implying that the mean date-1 endowment is known (and so does not depend
on the signal). For example, if, conditional on η, the distribution of date-1 consumption is equal
to x˜+ ηε˜, where E[ε˜|x] = 0 for all x, then higher realizations of η lead to riskier posterior beliefs
about date-1 consumption. The assumption that the posteriors are ordered by riskiness excludes
perfect information: it might be possible to learn the state of nature, but it is impossible to learn
the state with probability 1.
Proposition 4 If an information structure orders the posteriors by riskiness and if date-1 utility
v satisfies zv000 + 2v00 = 0 for all z > 0 (equivalently, zv0 is affine), then information has no effect
on the average equity premium. If zv000 + 2v00 6= 0 for some z > 0, then there is a prior belief and
an information structure that orders the posteriors by riskiness such that information raises the
average equity premium.
Proof : Appendix.
Recall that prudence is P (z) = −v000(z)/v00(z) and relative prudence is zP (z). The condition in the
first sentence of Proposition 4 says that zP (z) = 2 for all z > 0, equivalently that date-1 utility
takes the form v(z) = az+log z for a ≥ 0. Proposition 4 implies that if information is purely about
the riskiness of consumption, then there is no utility function such that information always lowers
the average equity premium.
Indeed, information always raises the equity premium for a class of date-1 utility functions if
the posteriors are ordered by riskiness of consumption. Consider the expected rate of return on
equity, V1 =
R
zdF/
R
zv0dF . An increase in risk does not affect the expected return on equity
(the numerator), and it decreases the price of equity (the denominator) if zv0 is strictly concave, or
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zv000+2v00 < 0. Now consider the forward price of equity, V2 =
R
zv0dF/
R
v0dF .23 The denominator
increases (or is constant) with an increase in risk if v0 is convex, or v000 ≥ 0. And the numerator
decreases if zv0 is strictly concave in z. So if v0 is convex and zv0 is strictly concave — more compactly,
if 0 ≤ zP (z) < 2 − then V1 and minus V2 are comonotonic, implying by Lemma 1 that information
always raises the average equity premium if the posteriors are ordered by riskiness.
Theorem 2 (Riskiness of z) Consider any information structure that orders the posterior beliefs
by riskiness. The equity premium increases with such information if v0 is convex and zv0 is strictly
concave; or equivalently if 0 ≤ zP (z) < 2 for all z.
To interpret the preference restriction, consider the static two-asset portfolio problem with one
safe and one risky asset. The restriction on relative prudence is exactly what ensures that the
demand for the risky asset falls as its return distribution becomes riskier (Hadar and Seo, 1990,
Theorem 2).24 One way to interpret Theorem 2 is that, if demand for a risky asset always falls
as its risk increases, then information about the volatility of equity must raise the average equity
premium.
Why is it that information about the volatility of equity increases the average equity premium
for this class of preferences? The average equity premium rises with information if the equity
premium increases at an increasing rate as the date-1 price of equity gets riskier. The assumption
that 0 ≤ zP (z) < 2 insures that the demand for equity falls as it becomes riskier; this fall in
demand lowers the date-0 price of equity, Pe(F ) =
R
zv0dF . Since the mean endowment is not
affected by information, the lower price for equity raises its expected rate of return. And since
v000 > 0, the agent is “prudent”—the agent saves more in response to an increase in future income
risk (Leland, 1968). The higher supply of saving pushes the risk-free rate down. Each effect on its
own ensures that the equity premium rises as equity gets riskier. Together, they ensure that the
23 Abel (2002) shows that V2 is decreasing in the riskiness of ?z in the case of small risks. It can easily be shown
that this is generally not true for large risks.
24More precisely, let v0 > 0, v00 < 0, and v000 ≥ 0. Hadar and Seo prove that an increase in risk always lowers the
demand for the risky asset for every wealth level if and only if zv0 is concave.
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equity premium rises at an increasing rate as as equity becomes riskier, so the equity premium is
convex in beliefs.
What can be said about the size of relative prudence? Under decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA), relative risk aversion is bounded above by relative prudence. Under DARA, relative
prudence less than 2 implies that relative risk aversion is also less than 2. Indeed, for CRRA utility
(v0(z) = z−γ), relative prudence is equal to γ − 1, so Example 2 (learning only about the variance
of consumption) is a special case of Proposition 2. Although there is no agreement about what is
a “reasonable” number for relative risk aversion in an aggregate model, opinion seems to cluster in
the interval (1, 3) (see, e.g. the survey by Kocherlakota (1996)). So 2 might seem a low number
for relative prudence. On the other hand, studies which try to estimate relative prudence directly
with household level data often report estimates below 2, even below 1.25
5.4 Constant risk-free rate in the informed economy
Return now to Example 4, the CRRA/log-normal specification in which the signals do not affect
the risk-free rate. It suggests that if risk aversion is at least moderately high (γ > 1) and the signals
do not affect the risk free rate (much), then information raises the average equity premium. Does
this conclusion generalize to other preferences and distributions? What aspects of the CRRA/log-
normal case is responsible for the result?
The risk-free rate in that case is 1/E[v0|η] = exp(γ(μ(η) − γσ2(η)/2)). To keep the risk-free
rate constant, the mean and variance of log consumption must move in the same direction as
news arrives. Recall that information raises the average equity premium if the rate of return of
equity and the forward price of equity move in opposite directions as news arrives (Lemma 1).
The striking conclusion from Example 4 now follows from Lemma 1 and two facts: if γ > 1, the
function zv0(z) = z1−γ is more concave than v0(z) = z−γ ; and when the variance and mean of log
25 See e.g. Dynan (1993) and her references.
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consumption rise in such a way to keep E[v0|η] constant, the distribution of v0 becomes riskier.26
Since zv0 is more concave than v0, E[zv0] falls whenever the distribution of v0 undergoes a (mean-
preserving) increase in risk. And since v0−γ is convex and decreasing, the identity function is
more convex than v0, so E[z] rises with an increase in the riskiness of v0.27
We conjecture that information raises the average equity premium if (i) the information struc-
ture orders the posteriors by riskiness of v0; (ii) v000 > 0 (to ensure that z is more convex than v0);
and (iii) zv0 is more concave than v0. Condition (iii) it turns out is equivalent to the condition that
risk aversion is less than twice prudence.
Lemma 2 For an increasing, concave C3 utility v on a real open interval I, the function zv0 is
more concave than v0 if and only if P (z) ≤ 2A(z) for all z ∈ I.
Proof : Appendix.
Lemmata 1 and 2 give us
Theorem 3 (Riskiness of v0) Suppose that (i) the information structure orders the posterior
beliefs by riskiness of v0 (so that the risk-free rate is not affected by the signal), and (ii) prudence
is positive and uniformly less than twice risk aversion (0 < P (z) < 2A(z) for all z ≥ 0). Then
information raises the average equity premium.
For CRRA utility prudence is less than twice risk aversion precisely when relative risk aversion
(γ) is greater than 1. But this relationship between risk aversion and the inequality P (z) < 2A(z) is
26 That the distribution of v0 becomes riskier is easy to verify formally from the density function for v0 and the
relationship μ(η) − γσ2(η)/2 = constant. Also z1−γ = T (z−γ) for the function T (y) = y(γ−1)/γ , which is concave
whenever γ ≥ 1.
27z = T (z−γ) for T (y) = y−1/γ , which is convex. Note that a linear function can be more convex than a decreasing
convex function.
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an artifact of CRRA preferences. If absolute risk aversion is constant, prudence and risk aversion
are always the same, so clearly P < 2A no matter what the degree of risk aversion. And for the
function v(z) = ln z − z on [0, 1], prudence is greater than twice risk aversion; but that function is
more risk averse than ln z (for which P = 2A). Despite what the CRRA case suggests, the level of
risk aversion in general has nothing to do with whether information raises the equity premium when
the risk-free rate is constant. Theorem 3 once again illustrates the danger of using single-parameter
utility functions, such as CRRA, to understand asset pricing.
How do we interpret the inequality P < 2A? It has appeared before, especially in the literature
on whether independent risky assets are complements or substitutes (Gollier, 2001, chapter 10).
We now argue that P < 2A means that equity and total saving are substitutes, in the sense that
allowing an agent to invest in equity lowers total saving. Suppose that an agent (with additively
separable and concave utility) lives two periods, has a nonrandom consumption endowment of date-
1 consumption, and can save by investing in a safe asset. Now a risky asset becomes available and
the agent optimally invests a positive amount in it. The question is: Does optimal saving go up
or down? It clearly goes down if the marginal utility of saving in the one-asset problem is greater
than the expected marginal utility of saving in the two-asset problem (evaluated at the solution
for the two-asset problem). We know already that adding a risky asset raises the marginal utility
of wealth in a one-period problem if and only if P < 2A globally (Gollier and Kimball, 1995).28
Replace “wealth” with “saving” to conclude that adding a risky asset always lowers total saving
if and only if P < 2A. Intuitively, adding a risky asset does two things: it raises expected date 2
consumption; and it introduces uncertainty about date-1 consumption. Raising date-1 consumption
lowers the marginal utility of saving since v0 is decreasing, and what governs how much v0 falls when
consumption increases is absolute risk aversion. Increasing uncertainty about date-1 consumption
tends to raise it if v0 is convex, and what governs how much v0 increases with an increase in
uncertainty is absolute prudence. The condition P < 2A ensures that prudence isn’t “too large,”
so marginal utility of saving falls with the addition of a risky asset.
28 See Gollier (2001, pp. 146-7). That the introduction of a risk asset lowers the marginal utility of wealth when
P < 2A follows almost immediately from Lemma 2 and the Arrow-Pratt theorem on comparative risk aversion.
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Whether equity and saving are substitutes is an empirical question, one made challenging by
the definition of substitutability: saving falls when a consumer previously constrained to hold no
equity is allowed to hold equity. The fraction of consumers who hold no equity has fallen steeply in
the U.S. over the past few decades. Perhaps one way to answer the question is to determine how
total saving changes after a consumer begins to hold equity.
Finally, the quantitative argument at the end of Section 4—that information can raise the equity
premium by any percentage while matching mean growth and the risk-free rate—holds in the general
case if P < 2A: as the distribution of v0 becomes riskier, the average equity premium in the informed
economy grows without bound and the equity premium in the uninformed economy falls.
6 Information and the equity premium in an infinite horizonmodel
We can interpret our two-period results as applying to “one-period ahead” equity which pays off
the random endowment one period hence, then expires. Although the two-period model allows us
to use arbitrary preferences for the representative agent, one may wonder whether our results are
an artifact of the two-period assumption. We can extend our results to the infinite horizon case if
we restrict both preferences and the endowment. In what follows we assume that the vN-M utility
takes the additively separable form
v(z0) +
∞X
t=1
βt−1v(zt)
where β ∈ (0, 1). In this setting “equity” denotes a claim on all future state-contingent consump-
tion. Proceeding along of the lines of the argument in Section 2, the equilibrium date-t price of
equity is
Pe(t) =
Et[
P∞
j=1 β
jv0(ezt+j)ezt+j ]
v0(zt)
, (17)
where Et is the expectations operator conditional on date-t information. The date-t return on
equity is
R(t) =
zt+1 + Pe(t+ 1)
Pe(t)
(18)
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and the risk-free rate between dates t and t+1 is
Rf (t+ 1) =
v0(zt)
βEt[v0(ezt+j)] . (19)
The date-t equity premium, φ(t), is
Et[R(t)]
Rf (t+ 1)
=
βEt [v0(ezt+1)]
Et
hP∞
j=1 β
jv0(ezt+j)ezt+ji
Ã
Et [ezt+1] +Et "P∞j=1 βjv0(ezt+1+j)ezt+1+jv0(ezt+1)
#!
. (20)
The capital gains component, Pe(t + 1), in the return to equity prevents us from applying
Lemma 1 directly to determine the effect of information. In the case of log utility at each date,
however, Pe(t) = ztβ/(1− β) for all t, in which case the date-t equity premium collapses to
φ(t) = Et
£ezt+1¤ Et ∙ 1ezt+1
¸ µ
= Et[ezt+1]Et[v0(ezt+1)]¶,
exactly as in the two-period model: every result in the two-period model for log utility continues to
hold in the infinite horizon model, no matter what the endowment distribution. To move beyond
log utility, we restrict the endowment process and possibly preferences.
6.1 Independent growth rates, isoelastic period utility
For t = 0, 1, 2..., now let ezt+1 = eyt+1zt, for some random variable eyt+1 with support in a bounded
interval [a, b] with b > a > 0, with the eyt+1 independently (but not necessarily identically) distrib-
uted. And now for t = 0, 1, 2..., let period utility take the form v(z) = (1 − γ)−1z1−γ for some
0 6= γ < 1; or v(z) = ln z. Now find the date-t return is
R(t) =
yt+1
³
1 +Et[eΩt+1]´
βEt[ey1−γt ](1 +Et[eΩt+1]) (21)
29
where Ωt+1 =
P∞
j=1 β
j
³
Πji=1y
1−γ
t+1+i
´
, and the expected return simplifies to
Et[R(t)] =
Et[eyt+1]
βEt[ey1−γt+1 ] . (22)
The date-t equity premium is just
φ(t) =
Et[ey−γt+1]Et[eyt+1]
Et[ey1−γt+1 ] , (23)
exactly as in the two-period model. We consider two different comparative statics. Suppose
that the eyt are identically distributed (say all equal to y˜), so the date t equity premium is
φ = E[ey−γ ]E[ey]/Et[ey1−γ ] for all t. We can then ask what would happen to the average equity
premium if the agent receives information at date zero about the distribution of ey. Here the infor-
mation is received only once, but is long-lived. Or we can assume that the agent receives a signal at
each date, but concerning only next period’s growth rate. Information is received every period, but
is short-lived. In either case we can apply Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 to φ(t) or to φ to determine
how information affects the equity premium. We summarize the results for the infinite-horizon
model in Table 2. The first column restricts the information structure.
posteriors ordered by ↓ γ < 1 γ = 1 γ > 1 Corollary of ↓
FSD +/− − +/− Proposition 5
MLR − − − Theorem 1
Riskiness of z + 0 − Theorem 2
Riskiness of v0 − 0 + Theorem 3
Table 2: Effect of information on the average equity premium in the infinite-horizon
model: period marginal utility v0(z) = z−γ and independent growth rates. The first
column restricts the information structure by how the signals order the posteriors; the first row
specifies the elasticity of substitution γ.
6.2 I.i.d. endowment, arbitrary period utility
With independent growth rates and isoelastic period utility all the results from the two-period
model hold. But as we pointed out in Section 5.4, the assumption of isoelastic period utility can
obscure the conditions which determine how information affects the equity premium. We can prove
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results for arbitrary period utility—provided we assuming that the endowment is independently
and identically distributed across time. The iid assumption unfortunately implies that there is no
growth, but this subsection should help convince the reader that the two-period results are at least
somewhat robust.
Use the assumption that the ezt are identically and independently distributed in equation (20)
to find the equity premium to be
φ = (1− β)E[ez]E[v0(ez)]
E[v0(ez)ez] + βE
∙
1
v0(ez)
¸
E[v0(ez)]. (24)
Since we assume that the endowment is i.i.d. to obtain (24), we have to restrict information to
date 0 and it affects beliefs about all future consumption (long-lived information obtained once).
Our Theorems about the one-period equity premium determine whether the first term is concave
or convex on a set of beliefs. The second term is the product of two linear functions of beliefs.
It is concave whenever E[1/v0] and E[v0] are anti-comonotonic, and convex whenever they are
co-monotonic. For any FOSD change, E[1/v0] and E[v0] are anti-comonotonic, so the Theorem 1
(MLR) goes through for this case without modification. If the posteriors are ordered by riskiness
of v0, then the second term is linear in beliefs, so our Theorem 3 (Riskiness of v0) goes through
without modification as well. If posteriors are ordered by riskiness of z, then E[1/v0] and E[v0]
are comonotonic if 1/v0 is convex or Prudence is at least twice Risk Aversion. (Of course the last
assumption is merely sufficient; the equity premium can be convex overall if P < 2A.) To sum
up: In the infinite horizon economy with i.i.d. endowment, with C3, strictly increasing and strictly
concave (but otherwise arbitrary) period utility v and discount factor 0 < β < 1, the conclusions
of Theorems 1 (MLR) and 3 (Riskiness of v0) hold; if, in addition, Prudence is at least twice Risk
Aversion, the conclusion of Theorem 2 (Riskiness of z) holds. Note that as β → 0, the date-t equity
premium converges to the static counterpart. As β → 1 it converges to the “capital gains” part of
the equity premium, E[1/v0(ez)]E[v0(ez)].
31
7 Concluding Remarks
Information can either raise or lower the average equity premium. When information is about
the level of future consumption in the sense that the signals order the posterior beliefs by MLR,
information lowers the average equity premium—as the intuition from perfect information suggests
it should. Information not purely about the level of consumption, however, can easily raise the
average equity premium, especially if the signals do not affect the risk-free rate much.
These results extend to an infinite horizon model for the special case of independent growth
rates and standard time-separable, isoelastic preferences (or i.i.d. endowment with arbitrary period
utility). As mentioned, one natural interpretation of that extension comes from supposing that
information improves through time (perhaps because of faster and cheaper personal computers
leading to cheaper information). Since information is apt to be about both the level and the
volatility of equity, our results do not predict what should happen to the equity premium over
time, but they do remove some surprise at the possibility that it could rise through time. More
broadly, the important condition to check is the one given in Lemma (ii), which says that the
expected rate of return on equity and the forward price of equity are comonotonic, a condition
which could in principle be tested.
We have assumed that people have the same information. If different people have different
information (and this asymmetric information is not revealed by equilibrium prices), then the effect
of better information on the equity premium is harder to determine. Clearly, if public information
is close enough to perfect, then it must lower the equity premium: individuals not only have more
information, but informational asymmetry falls with better public information. Determining how
information affects the average equity premium when information is asymmetric would be both
challenging and interesting.29
As a final observation, return to the interpretation that information is private to investors
29For a survey of information aggregation in markets, see Vives (2008).
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but unobserved by the economist. If information is purely about volatility (of consumption, log
consumption or the marginal utility of consumption) then the average equity premium could be
higher than one calculated by an economist who ignores private information. As we already men-
tioned, Weitzman (2007) considers a Bayesian model in which agents learn about consumption
variance from past experience. He shows that the equity premium which takes into account the
“sampling error” from such learning can be dramatically higher than the one calculated assuming
that the variance is known and equal to the sample variance from historical data. In his model,
as in the private information interpretation of ours, at each date t agents and the economist have
different beliefs about future consumption. Since our agent’s beliefs are an updated version of the
economist’s, our agent cannot believe an event possible that the economist thinks impossible. In
principle, Weitzman’s Bayesian agent could believe that some outcomes are possible that an econo-
mist who just uses historical frequencies thinks are impossible. In that sense our model imposes
added discipline on the relationship between beliefs of the economist and agents.
Appendix: Proofs
We use the following Lemma in several proofs. Although it follows from known results (see Machina,
1982, and Wang, 1993, for example), we include the simple proof to make our presentation self-
contained.
Lemma 3 For i = 1, 2 we have
Vi(G)− Vi(F ) =
Z 1
0
µZ
Ui(z;λG+ (1− λ)F )d(G− F )
¶
dλ, (A.1)
where
U1(z;F ) =
z − zv0(z)V1(F )R
ξv0(ξ)dF (ξ)
, (A.2)
and
U2(z;F ) =
zv0(z)− v0(z)V2(F )R
v0(ξ)dF (ξ)
. (A.3)
33
Thus if Ui(·,H) is increasing for every c.d.f. H, then Vi(G) ≥ Vi(F ) whenever G FSD dominates
F ; if Ui(·,H) is convave for every c.d.f. H, then Vi(G) ≥ Vi(F ) whenever F is riskier than G.
Proof of Lemma 3: First note that, by the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we have
Vi(G)− Vi(F ) =
Z µ
d
dα
Vi(αG+ (1− α)F )|α=λ
¶
dλ. (A.4)
Now
d
dα
V1(αG+ (1− α)F ) =
R
zd(G− F )R
zv0(z)d(αG+ (1− α)F ) −
V1(αG+ (1− α)F )
R
zv0(z)d(G− F )R
zv0(z)d(αG+ (1− α)F ) .
Rearrange and use (A.2) to find
d
dα
V1(αG+ (1− α)F )|α=λ =
Z
U1(z;αG+ (1− α)F )d(G− F ),
and substitute this expression into (A.4) for i = 1 to find that
V1(G)− V1(F ) =
Z 1
0
µZ
U1(z;λG+ (1− λ)F )d(G− F )
¶
dλ.
For i = 2, we have
d
dα
V2(αG+ (1− α)F ) =
R
zv0(z)d(G− F )R
v0(z)d(αG+ (1− α)F ) −
V2(αG+ (1− α)F )
R
v0(z)d(G− F )R
v0(z)d(αG+ (1− α)F ) .
Use (A.3) and substitute into (A.4) to get (A.1) for i = 2. The rest of the Lemma follows from
standard stochastic dominance arguments (e.g. Gollier, 2001, chapter 3). ¥
Proof of Lemma 1: We now show that Lemma 1 is a consequence of the following extension
of the covariance inequality (Hardy, et. al., Theorem 43), namely, for a finite set S and real-
valued positive functions f , g on S, we have
P
s∈S f(s)g(s)π(s) ≤
P
s∈S f(s)π(s)
P
s∈S g(s)π(s)
for all positive π with
P
π(s) = 1 if and only if g and −f are comonotonic. We write Eπ[f ] =P
s∈S f(s)π(s).
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Lemma 4 For a finite set S and real-valued positive functions f , g and h and π on S, we have
Eπ
∙
fg
h
¸
≤ Eπ[f ]Eπ[g]
Eπ[h]
for all π with
P
π(s) = 1 if and only if g/h and −f/h are comonotonic.
To prove Lemma 4, define
π∗(s) =
h(s)π(s)
Eπ[h]
for all s ∈ S and note that
Eπ
∙
fg
h
¸
= Eπ[h]Eπ∗
∙
f
h
g
h
¸
. (A.5)
By the Covariance Inequality, we have
Eπ∗
∙
f
h
g
h
¸
≤ Eπ∗
∙
f
h
¸
Eπ∗
hg
h
i
(A.6)
for all probability distributions π∗ (equivalently, all probability distributions π) if and only if f/h
and −g/h are comonotonic. Combining (A.5) and (A.6) we have
Eπ
∙
fg
h
¸
≤ Eπ[h]Eπ∗
∙
f
h
¸
Eπ∗
hg
h
i
≤ Eπ[f ]Eπ[g]
Eπ[h]
, (A.7)
for all probability distributions π if and only if f/h and −g/h are comonotonic, which proves
Lemma 4. To prove Lemma 1, take S = {F1, F2}, f(Fi) =
R
zdFi, g(Fi) =
R
v0(z)dFi, and
h(Fi) =
R
zv0(z)dFi, for i = 1, 2 and note that f , g and h are linear (e.g. f(λF2 + (1 − λ)F1) =
λf(F2) + (1− λ)f(F1)), so the last term in (A.7) is the equity premium with no information. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: By Proposition 4, a necessary condition for the average equity
premium never to increase with information is that the utility function takes the form v(z) =
az + log z for a ≥ 0. The rate of return on equity in this case is
V1(F ) =
R
zdF (Z)R
azdF (z) + 1
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and the forward price of equity is
V2(F ) =
R
azdF (z) + 1
a+
R
(1/z)dF (z)
.
Let G and F be nondegenerate c.d.f.’s in D with G riskier than F , so that V2(G) < V2(F ) and
V1(G) = V1(F ). Since the Vi’s are continuous on D (and F does not maximize V1 on D), there is
an H in D such that V2(H) < V2(F ) and V1(H) > V1(F ). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of
Lemma 5 The following are equivalent:
1. The average equity premium falls for every prior belief/information structure combination
that orders the posteriors by FSD.
2. For all z > 0, 1− v
0(∞)
v0(z) ≤ RRA(z) ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 5: To prove that (b) implies (a), suppose that 1−(v0(∞)/v0(z)) ≤ RRA(z) ≤
1 for all z > 0 and let F2 FSD dominate F1. If v0(∞) = 0, then the result is immediate by Lemma
1, since RRA(z) ≡ 1. So suppose that v0(∞) > 0. Since R ≤ 1, we have that U2(·;F ) defined by
(A.3) is increasing for every F, so that V2(F2) ≥ V2(F1). We now show that V1(F2) ≥ V1(F1). We
have for any c.d.f. H
µZ
ξv0(ξ)dH(ξ)
¶
U 01(z;H) = 1−
¡
v0(z) + zv00(z)
¢
V1(H)
= 1− v0(z) (1−RRA(z))V1(H)
≥ 1− v0(z)v
0(∞)
v0(z)
V1(H)
= 1−
R
ξdH(ξ)R
ξv0(ξ)dH(ξ)
v0(∞)
≥ 1−
R
ξdH(ξ)
v0(∞)
R
ξdH(ξ)
v0(∞) = 0.
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Since
R
zv0(z)dH(z) > 0, these inequalities imply that U1(·,H) is increasing for any H. By Lemma
3, V1(F2) ≥ V1(F1).
To prove that (a) implies (b), suppose first that R(y) = −yv00(y)/v0(y) > 1 for some y, so
that (b) fails. By continuity of R(·), there is some positive open interval I containing y such that
−zv00(z)/v0(z) > 1 for all z in I. Hence, for any c.d.f H, we have U 01(z;H) > 0 on I. Let G1 and G2
be any c.d.f.’s which are equal off of I but G2 FSD dominates G1. Define Fi = pδ1−p + (1 − p)Gi
for i = 1, 2 where 1− p > 0 is less than any point in I.30 Then F2 FSD dominates F1 and F2 = F1
off of I, so that V1(F2)− V1(F1) > 0 for any such p.
Now
∙Z
v0d(λF2 + (1− λ)F1)
¸ Z
U2(z;λF2 + (1− λ)F1)d(F2 − F1)
=
Z
zv0(z)d(G2 −G1) + V2(λF2 + (1− λ)F1)
Z
v0(z)d(G2 −G1)
We have
R
zv0(z)d(G2 −G1) < 0, since zv0 is strictly decreasing on I. Moreover,
V2(λF2 + (1− λ)F1) =
(1− p)
R
zv0d(λG2 + (1− λ)G1) + p(1− p)v0(1− p)
(1− p)
R
v0d(λG2 + (1− λ)G1) + pv0(1− p)
As p tends to 1, V2(λF2 + (1− λ)F1) tends to 0. Thus for p close enough to 1,
R
U2(z;λF2 + (1−
λ)F1)d(F2 − F1) < 0 and by Lemma A.1, V2(F2)− V2(F1) < 0.
Now suppose that 1 − (v0(∞)/v0(y)) > R(y) for some y > 0. By continuity of R(·) and of v0,
there is some open interval N of y such that 1 − (v0(∞)/v0(y)) > RRA(z) for all z in N. Hence
U 02(z;H) > 0 for any c.d.f. H and any z in N. Suppose first that v0(∞) > 0. Since RRA(z) < 1 on
30 The notation δp stands for the c.d.f. that puts probability 1 on the point p. Since there are at least three states
of the world, it is always possible to construct Fi’s and Gi’s with the indicated properties.
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N and v0 is decreasing, we have, for any z in N and any F
∙Z
ξv0(ξ)dF (ξ)
¸
U 01(z, F ) = 1−
¡
v0(z) + zv00(z)
¢ R ξdF (ξ)R
ξv0(ξ)dF (ξ)
≤ 1−
¡
v0(z) + zv00(z)
¢ 1
v0(∞)
= 1− (1−RRA(z)) v
0(z)
v0(∞) < 0.
Thus, if F2 first-order dominates F1 and the two distributions are equal off of the interval N, we
have V2(F2)− V2(F1) > 0 and V1(F2)− V1(F1) < 0.
If v0(∞) = 0, let G1 and G2 be any c.d.f.’s which are equal off of N but G2 FSD dominates
G1. Define Fi = pδ(1−p)−1 +(1− p)Gi for i = 1, 2 where (1− p)−1 exceeds any point in N. Then F2
FSD dominates F1 and F2 = F1 off of N , so that V2(F2)− V2(F1) > 0 for any such p.
Now
∙Z
yv0(y)d(λF2 + (1− λ)F1)
¸
U 01(z, λF2 + (1− λ)F1)
= 1−
¡
v0(z) + zv00(z)
¢
V1(λF2 + (1− λ)F1),
where
V1(λF2 + (1− λ)F1) =
(1− p)
R
yd(λG2 + (1− λ)G1) + p(1− p)−1
(1− p)
R
yv0(y)d(λG2 + (1− λ)G1) + p(1− p)−1v0((1− p)−1)
=
(1− p)2
R
yd(λG2 + (1− λ)G1) + p
(1− p)2
R
yv0(y)d(λG2 + (1− λ)G1) + pv0((1− p)−1)
.
As p tends to 1, V1 tends to ∞. Thus, for p close enough to 1, U 01(z, λF2 + (1 − λ)F1) < 0 on N
and hence V1(F2)− V1(F1) < 0. ¥
Proof of Theorem 1: V2 rises with MLR by Milgrom (1981, Section 3). We will show that
V1 rises with MLR as well. Suppose that F2 MLR dominates F1. Letting
k =
R
zdF1R
zv0(z)dF1
,
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we need to show that R
zdF2R
zv0(z)dF2
≥ k
or equivalently
R
(z − kzv0(z)) dF2 ≥ 0. Since v is strictly concave, j(z) = z (1− kv0(z)) crosses zero
on R++ at most once from below, when 1 = kv0(z). Hence j satisfies the single-crossing property in
z and therefore
R
(z − kzv0(z)) dF1 = 0 implies that
R
(z − kzv0(z)) dF2 ≥ 0 (see e.g. Gollier, 2001,
p. 102, Proposition 16). ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: We have that
µZ
ξv0(ξ)dF (ξ)
¶
U 001 (z;F ) = −
¡
2v00 + zv000
¢
V1 (A.8)
and
µZ
v0(ξ)dF (ξ)
¶
U 002 (z;F ) = 2v
00 + zv000 − v000V2 (A.9)
=
−U 001 (z;F )
V1
− v000V2. (A.10)
Observe that if 2v00 + zv000 ≡ 0, then U 001 (z;H) = 0 for every H and so V1(F2) = V1(F1) whenever
F2 is riskier than F1. Hence the equity premium is unchanged by information when the posteriors
are ordered by riskiness.
Suppose now that 2v00(y) + yv000(y) 6= 0 for some y > 0. Since v00 and v000 are continuous, there
is a positive number ε and an interval (a, b) with a > 0 such that |2v00(z) + zv000(z)| > ε on (a, b).
Let G1 and G2 be any c.d.f.’s with support in [0, 2b] which are equal outside (a, b) with G2 riskier
than G1. Define F
p
i = pδ1−p+ (1− p)Gi for i = 1, 2 where a > 1− p > 0. Clearly F2 is riskier than
F1. Letting Gλ = λG2 + (1− λ)G1 for λ ∈ [0, 1], we have
V2(λF
p
2 + (1− λ)F
p
1 ) =
p(1− p)v0(1− p) + (1− p)
R
zv0dGλ
pv0(1− p) + (1− p)
R
v0dGλ
= (1− p) p+
R
zv0dGλ
p+ 1−pv0(1−p)
R
v0dGλ
which tends to zero uniformly in λ as p tends to 1.
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And since v000 is continuous, it is bounded on [0, 2b], so the product v000(z)V2(λF p2 + (1− λ)F
p
1 )
tends to zero uniformly in λ, z as p tends to 1. Moreover V1(λF
p
2 + (1 − λ)F
p
1 ) is bounded as a
function of (p, λ). So for some p close enough to 1, U 002 (z;λF2+(1−λ)F1) and U 001 (z;λF2+(1−λ)F1)
will be of opposite signs for every λ in [0, 1] and z ∈ [0, 2b]. By Lemma 3,
³
V1(F
p
2 )− V1(F
p
1 )
´³
V2(F
p
2 )− V
p
2 (F1)
´
< 0,
and by Lemma 1 information raises the average equity premium. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Since v0 is strictly decreasing, there is a function T defined on the range
of v0 such that zv0(z) = T (v0(z)) for all z ∈ I. Differentiate to find that
zv00(z) + v0(z) = T 0(v0(z))v00(z), (A.11)
so
T 0(v0(z)) = z − 1
A(z)
. (A.12)
Differentiate (A.11) and use (A.12) to conclude
T 00(v0(z))v00(z) = 2− P (z)
A(z)
, (A.13)
so T is concave if and only if P/A < 2 on I. ¥
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